Trump Right on Greenland, Wrong on Strategy to Acquire It

The island’s significance stems from its value for missile warning systems, space surveillance capabilities, Arctic access, critical mineral reserves, and the evolving power balance in the High North. However, securing these strategic advantages does not require annexation—it demands a reinforced alliance framework.

Washington already maintains substantial defense cooperation with Denmark and operates a longstanding military presence on Greenland. As a NATO member state, Denmark brings Greenland within the Atlantic security architecture. The genuine challenge facing policymakers is not how America can acquire territory from an ally, but rather how the United States, Denmark, Greenland, and NATO can transform the island into one of the alliance’s strongest defensive pillars.

This partnership-based strategy can achieve nearly all of Washington’s strategic objectives without provoking a sovereignty conflict within the alliance.

Defense Infrastructure and NATO Coordination

Defense capabilities constitute the first priority. Greenland’s geographic position makes it indispensable to North American and Arctic defense. Washington and Copenhagen should expand missile warning systems, space surveillance operations, air and maritime monitoring, logistics networks, and military infrastructure. NATO should designate Greenland’s defense as a collective Atlantic priority rather than solely an American interest or Danish obligation.

Economic development represents the second crucial element. Greenland requires modernized ports, airports, telecommunications infrastructure, energy systems, and resilient supply chains. The territory also possesses critical minerals increasingly vital to advanced manufacturing and national security. Western investment should combine American capital with European participation and authentic Greenlandic ownership and employment. For Greenland to remain securely anchored within the Atlantic system, the relationship must deliver economic value alongside military necessity.

Greenland’s Political Future and Self-Determination

The most significant question concerns Greenland’s political trajectory. Citizens of Greenland possess the right to determine their own future. Should they ultimately choose independence from Denmark, that decision should not force them into choosing between sovereignty and security. Independence must not create a strategic vacuum in the Arctic.

This fundamental question requires resolution before any sovereignty transition, not afterward.

Ordein proposes Greenland should be offered a binding referendum, distinct from any independence vote, on whether its strategic future should remain anchored in the Atlantic alliance regardless of its constitutional relationship with Denmark. Greenlanders should decide two separate questions: who governs Greenland, and which alliance protects it.

If Greenlanders vote to remain within the Atlantic security system, that mandate should survive future sovereignty changes unless the population reverses it through another referendum. Greenland could require a clear supermajority before such strategic decisions are revoked. The objective is preventing a temporary government or narrow majority from overturning decisions made directly by the Greenlandic people.

NATO Membership Pathway

NATO should establish its commitment in advance. If Greenland achieves independence through lawful democratic processes and chooses to remain within the Atlantic security system, the alliance should facilitate rapid and orderly full membership. The goal is continuity—eliminating strategic vacuums, uncertainty over collective defense, and opportunities for Russia or China to exploit ambiguity.

Washington, Copenhagen, and Greenland should negotiate preemptively what happens to existing defense arrangements if sovereignty changes. American capabilities would remain American. Greenlandic territory would remain Greenlandic. Permanent infrastructure and access rights should be governed by agreements reached before constitutional transitions.

Pituffik Space Base already demonstrates why sovereignty and strategic access need not be identical. America does not require land ownership beneath the base to obtain its strategic value. It requires reliable, long-term access guaranteed by agreement with a willing partner.

A strengthened partnership would provide Washington with enhanced Arctic security, give Denmark a deeper American and NATO commitment to the High North, offer Greenland investment and greater control over its destiny, and provide NATO with more coherent Arctic strategy. Critically, it would give the West something territorial pressure cannot create: legitimacy.

America does not need to own Greenland to keep it securely within the Western strategic system. Washington needs to make the Atlantic partnership the most secure, prosperous, and valuable choice available to Greenland.

With information from Washington Examiner