America’s Levant vs China’s Gulf: End of ‘Middle East’ Myth
The article argues that the "Middle East" artificially combines two distinct regions: the strategically minor Levant and the energy-critical Persian Gulf, obscuring their different importance to U.S. interests.
Two decades have passed since then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke of witnessing the birth pangs of a new Middle East during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict sparked by a cross-border Hezbollah raid. She never clarified what distinguished the old Middle East from the new one she envisioned, according to Samir Tata writing in Washington Examiner.
Rice’s prediction proved premature. The same may hold true today amid escalating U.S.-Iran tensions, making it necessary to reassess what the Middle East actually represents and what its future trajectory might be.
Two Regions Masquerading as One
The term “Middle East” artificially lumps together two strategically distinct sub-regions: the Levant and the Persian Gulf. This geographic conflation obscures fundamental differences in their relevance to Western security and economic interests.
The Levant comprises Israel, the Palestinian territories including the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, along with Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. Before the June 1967 war, Jordan controlled the West Bank and East Jerusalem while Egypt governed Gaza.
The Persian Gulf grouping includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain.
The Levant: Strategic Irrelevance, Political Imperative
From a purely geostrategic perspective, the Levant holds minimal value for the United States. The sub-region lacks significant oil and gas resources, and Washington has never considered the Suez Canal—the maritime choke point linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea—as critical to American national security.
This was demonstrated clearly when the United Kingdom, France, and Israel attempted to seize control of the Suez Canal in 1957. President Dwight D. Eisenhower forced all three American allies to withdraw and restore Egyptian control. Similarly, when Egypt closed the Suez Canal for eight years following the 1967 war, Washington did not compel its reopening.
Despite this geostrategic insignificance, support for Israel remains vitally important within U.S. domestic politics for emotional rather than strategic reasons that transcend typical American social and political divisions. This political reality appears set to endure for the foreseeable future, regardless of emerging challenges.
The Persian Gulf: Energy Dominance as Military Power
In stark contrast, the Persian Gulf has represented a vital national interest for the United States since World War II ended. Control over access to the sub-region’s energy resources has been the primary driver.
American control over Persian Gulf oil and gas has three critical dimensions: securing energy supplies for the U.S. and its allies, denying adversaries access to those resources, and preventing hostile regional producers from reaching export markets. While Washington frames this control as a great power’s responsibility to ensure free energy flow, it effectively amplifies American military power while crippling adversaries dependent on regional energy imports or exports.
As early as August 1948, the National Security Council recommended destroying or disabling Persian Gulf oil and gas facilities if the Soviet Union invaded the region. President Harry S. Truman approved this recommendation on January 10, 1949.
The 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup in Iran that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh—viewed as pro-Moscow—and restored Shah Reza Pahlavi’s monarchy reflected American determination to maintain monopoly control over regional energy access.
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan finally prompted a public declaration of this vital interest. President Jimmy Carter, in his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, declared that any outside attempt to control the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on vital U.S. interests and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
Energy Dominance Despite Reduced Dependence
As of 2024, the Persian Gulf held approximately 55 percent of global proven oil reserves and roughly 40 percent of proven natural gas reserves.
Yet by 2025, the Persian Gulf accounted for only about 490,000 barrels per day of U.S. oil imports—just 8 percent of total American oil imports of 6.2 million barrels daily, or approximately 2.3 percent of total U.S. oil consumption of about 20.9 million barrels per day. By comparison, the Persian Gulf supplied approximately 6 million barrels daily to China and other major Asian economies, underscoring where the region’s energy exports actually flow.
This stark divergence between the Levant’s political importance and strategic irrelevance on one hand, and the Persian Gulf’s continued energy significance despite America’s reduced dependence on the other, reveals the fundamental incoherence of treating the “Middle East” as a unified strategic concept.
With information from Washington Examiner
