Turkey: Selective revisionism and the law of the sea

Selective revisionist states, such as Turkey, seek to change specific aspects of the regional or international order – such as territorial boundaries, ideological influence, or power dynamics – without aiming to dismantle the global system, as do the so-called systemic revisionists (e.g. Russia, China, North Korea). They operate realistically within existing frameworks (e.g. NATO, UN, or economic systems), using gray-zone tactics – proxy war, economic coercion, disinformation, cyber operations, maritime provocations, or strategic ambiguity – to achieve goals while avoiding open conflict.

Turkey’s selective revisionism, driven by neo-Ottoman ambitions, regional power projection, and NATO-Russia balancing, employs tactics such as proxy forces (SADAT in Syria), maritime claims (Blue Homeland doctrine), and cultural influence (Diyanet in the Balkans). Selective revisionist states like Turkey include India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Pakistan, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Vietnam, and Egypt, each pursuing regional influence through gray-zone tactics – proxies, economic coercion, naval assertiveness, disinformation, and diplomatic maneuvering – while simultaneously engaging in global-scale frameworks (Quad, US, BRICS, ASEAN, NATO). India confronts China, Saudi Arabia/UAE/Egypt oppose the Iran/Turkey axis, Pakistan challenges India, Brazil/South Africa lead regionally, and Indonesia/Vietnam resist China’s maritime claims. Like Turkey, they balance regional ambitions with global integration, differentiating the global challenges of systemic revisionists. Deterring selective revisionism requires clear red lines, detection, resilience, proportional responses, ambiguity, alliances, and doctrinal integration, tailored to each state’s backers (e.g., US for India/Saudi Arabia/UAE, China for Pakistan) and adversaries (e.g., China versus India/Vietnam, Iran versus Saudi Arabia/UAE).

Recently, the challenge to the Law of the Sea and the incorporation of certain rules into their domestic law constitutes yet another characteristic of selective revisionism.

The recent cases of the Strait of Hormuz and the arrangements in the Aegean, by Iran and Turkey, are clear indications of the new trend.

THE HORMUZ DOCTRINE

A new legislative framework is emerging in the halls of the Majlis (Islamic Consultative Assembly – the Iranian Parliament) in Tehran. It is not just another law. It is the institutionalization of a new security doctrine that aspires to overturn the balance of power in the Persian Gulf and rewrite the rules of global navigation. The “Strait of Hormuz Management Plan,” as it is called, comes as a direct response to the war that began on February 28, 2026, with the American Operation Epic Fury and marks the end of the era of “innocent passage” as we knew it.

The basis of the Iranian argument is old, but is now being institutionalized. Iran signed but never ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. For Tehran, the Strait of Hormuz is not subject to Article 87 on “freedom of the high seas.” It is internal waters and Iran’s sovereign right to regulate passage.

What changes in 2026 is that this principle moves from rhetoric to legislation. Parliament approved on March 30 and 31 the bill that sets explicit terms of passage. The National Security Committee advanced it to the plenary as the “Law for the Establishment of Iran’s Sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.” Majlis Deputy Speaker Ali Nikzad characterized it as “as important as the nationalization of the oil industry” and warned that navigation will never return to the pre-war regime.

The plan has 12 articles. The three key ones that were leaked reveal the strategy:

First, total blockade of Israel. No Israeli ship will pass through the strait. Second, war reparations. Ships from “warring countries,” meaning the US and allies, will pay fees to pass, as compensation for damage they caused to Iran. Third, Tehran permission. All other ships need explicit permission from Iran.

Other articles that have been leaked include mandatory transit fees of approximately $2 million per ship, advance submission of ship and cargo details, mandatory route close to the Iranian coast, and payments in rial, yuan, or cryptocurrencies. The Revolutionary Guards, not the Ministry of Shipping, becomes the competent authority for issuing licenses.

The logic is the “economic mirror shield.” If you impose sanctions and harm Iran’s economy, you lose the right of innocent passage. The cost of each sanction automatically translates into the cost of passage. Want to export oil? Make sure Iran can do the same. If an Iranian tanker does not reach its destination due to blockade, the attacking fleet loses the legal right of navigation.

All this started from Operation Epic Fury. The US launched over 13,000 strikes on Iran from February 28, neutralizing leadership and dissolving infrastructure. Ayatollah Khamenei was killed. Tehran responded by closing the strait. Navigation fell 95%. About 2,000 ships were trapped in the Gulf. The US responded with a naval blockade on April 13.

In this context, Iran considers that International Law has collapsed. The US violated Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, on the prohibition of the use of force. The 5,000 sanctions that had already been imposed were also unilateral acts. Since the West uses its power outside International Law, Tehran believes it must respond in kind. For Iran and other countries, “wars give birth to laws,” therefore International Law is not a fixed set of truths, but a reflection of the balance of power on the battlefield.

Here lies the deeper geopolitical significance. Iran does not simply want fees. It wants to build a new regional system.

First, division into “us” and “them.” A “green corridor” is created for friendly countries. China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh will have preferential access. The West faces blockade. This breaks the unity of the Persian Gulf and creates an economic incentive for distancing from the US.

Second, co-responsibility. Iran introduces the principle that countries hosting American bases bear responsibility for damage caused by Washington. If Qatar or Bahrain give a base to the US, they will pay too. Thus regional allies of America are pressured to choose sides.

Third, alliance with Oman. Tehran proposes to Muscat a share in management and fees. Thus it creates a regional navigation regulator outside Western control. The stability of the strait becomes an economic benefit for many players, not just Iran.

Fourth, de-dollarization. The demand for payments in rial, yuan, or cryptocurrencies strikes at dollar supremacy. China’s Kunlun Bank and CIPS become alternative channels. Hormuz is transformed into a laboratory for a parallel financial system.

Tehran’s message is clear. The era when the lifting of sanctions depended on a unilateral signature in Washington is over. Iran demands a new balance: exchange of security for access. The strait, from an artery of free navigation, becomes guarantor of Iran’s territorial and economic integrity.

Innocent passage is not an acquired right. It is compensation for the fact that the US and allies refrain from military action against Iran. Every sanction, every bomb, is billed.

The West is in a difficult position. It became accustomed to imposing sanctions with impunity on weaker countries. Now Iran has found a pressure point: the 20% of global oil that passes through Hormuz. If the law passes, the world will face an unprecedented situation. The principle of free navigation of the UN clashes with the principle of power.

Donald Trump stated that Iran “has not paid a high enough price” and will reconsider the plan. Negotiations for a permanent end to the war include the opening of the Strait, in exchange for lifting the American blockade.

Iran believes that modern rules were born in the era of Western dominance. As that era fades, the rules collapse. Hormuz is the painful birth of a new world order. An order where power, not treaties, defines law.

THE LEGAL WAR IN THE AEGEAN AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

In the modern geopolitical environment, the rules-based international order is under pressure. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is in the crosshairs of a new category of actors: medium revisionist powers. Countries like Turkey and Iran are no longer limited to rhetorical challenges, but are intensifying the use of “Lawfare” (Legal Warfare), integrating their unilateral claims into their domestic legal order.

Recent legislative activity in Ankara and Tehran (May 2026) reveals a similarity of strategic logic. Both countries are attempting to impose new balances using their national parliaments.

Iran, through the Majilis, is promoting a plan for the management of the Straits of Hormuz that provides for the imposition of transit fees and control of navigation, violating the regime of “free passage.” This Iranian move is a response to the attack it received from the US and Israel, and its implementation or not depends on developments in the war.

At the same time, Turkey is proceeding with the incorporation of its continental shelf boundaries and the “Blue Homeland” into its domestic law, ignoring the rights of islands provided for by UNCLOS.

Both countries have not ratified UNCLOS, a fact that allows them to argue that they are not bound by it, while simultaneously invoking “general principles of equity” only when these serve their interests. They seek to transform international straits or maritime areas into zones of domestic jurisdiction, controlling geopolitical balances, energy flow, and trade.

This behavior is not isolated, but part of a broader global trend where medium and large powers challenge the supremacy of “Western” international law.

China, although not a medium power, is one of the inspirers of this strategy – because Turkey started the war in the gray zone in Cyprus and the Aegean, 50 years ago. Through the “Coast Guard Law,” China legitimizes domestically the use of force in waters that UNCLOS recognizes as EEZ of other states, creating a precedent that medium selective revisionist powers are studying closely.

Indonesia, as an archipelagic state, uses domestic regulations to limit the passage of foreign warships, trying to impose stricter rules than those provided for by the international convention.

India maintains a stance of “selective compliance,” enacting domestic provisions that require prior permission for military exercises in its EEZ, a position not recognized by UNCLOS, which permits military use of the EEZ by third states.

Regarding Egypt, the recent unilateral delimitation of its western maritime borders (by presidential decree) is an example of the use of domestic law to secure rights in areas bordering Libya, preempting claims by other actors in the region.

Medium powers pursue “strategic autonomy.” They consider that international law is a tool of the old great powers to limit the rise of new regional hegemons. Thus, Lawfare in the Gray Zone becomes the means to redesign the map without the use of missiles, but with the use of articles and paragraphs.

While Turkey follows the global trend, its own effort has unique characteristics that make it particularly dangerous for regional stability.

First, the Turkish move is a direct response to the strengthening of relations in the Greece-Cyprus-Israel axis. Ankara feels that this cooperation, supported by UNCLOS, “locks it” to its coasts. Its continental shelf legislation is an attempt to cancel in practice the East Med Gas Forum and the delimitations of its neighbors, presenting its own claims as “state law” that its armed forces are obliged to defend.

Second, Turkey applies the doctrine of “Blue Homeland” not only as a claim, but as an identity. The incorporation of these boundaries into the domestic legal order makes retreat politically impossible for any future Turkish government, as it would mean violation of the state’s own law.

Third, Turkey uses the doctrine of “Persistent Objector” consistently. By steadfastly refusing UNCLOS and enacting its own laws, it attempts to exempt itself from the creation of new customary law, hoping that in a future negotiation, its own domestic legislation will have the same specific weight as international treaties.

“Legal Warfare” in the Gray Zone constitutes the most sophisticated form of modern revisionism and operates in the following ways:

Legitimization of Expansionism: The revisionist power “dresses” its claims with legal terms. Turkey, for example, does not simply say “I want the Aegean,” but enacts laws on the continental shelf, creating a semblance of legality.

Provoking Confusion and Paralysis: Using deliberately vague or contradictory legal interpretations (e.g. challenging the demilitarization of islands in conjunction with sovereignty), the attacker forces the defender into a continuous legal and diplomatic defense, wasting resources and political capital.

Creating Faits Accomplis: Through domestic regulations or maps filed with international organizations, the revisionist power tries to transform an arbitrariness into “normality.” If the international community does not react immediately, this new “law” begins to solidify.

Legal Warfare is used to obstruct legitimate actions (e.g. hydrocarbon surveys) by presenting them as “illegal” based on the new domestic legislation of the revisionist power.

In essence, Legal warfare is the tool that transforms geopolitical pressure into legal order, making its confrontation extremely difficult, as the response requires a combination of legal science, diplomacy, and military deterrence.

Turkey and the other medium powers do not simply seek to win a dispute, but seek to change the paradigm of international legality.

If the selective revisionism of some medium powers and not only prevails, the sea will cease to be a space of cooperation and will be transformed into a mosaic of conflicting national laws, where the stronger will define his own “law.”

nfg-origin:gr