Realistic Prospects of the “Incompatibility”
Introducing a ministerial incompatibility in Greece may curb direct political horse-trading and invite technocrats, but entrenched party control and voter clientelism would persist, limiting real reform.
What would practically happen if the incompatibility between minister and member of parliament were implemented in Greece? Within the framework of the Hellenic Parliament and the strong party control over everything, the incompatibility would have meager results. There might possibly be some improvement in reducing direct political bargaining—i.e., MPs pressuring for ministerial appointments and ministers “feeding” their electoral districts. The incompatibility would theoretically also cut off direct exchanges with powerful figures, such as “support me and I’ll make you a minister.” Additionally, parliamentary oversight would become somewhat more serious, as MPs would no longer be bound by personal ambitions to become ministers and could more easily exercise criticism. Of course, they would still hardly see an electoral list that way. It is also possible that more technocrats would enter the government—in other words, more ministers outside Parliament, which would result in less need for “electoral clientele” and more administrative logic. This would improve certain sectors (e.g., economy, digital government).
However, it would not fundamentally change many basic things. The party machinery would remain dominant in Greece, where MPs depend heavily on their party for re-election, and the leadership controls lists, political promotion, and various roles. Essentially, the “discipline” is not broken, and government oversight would remain limited. Patronage would not disappear, it would only change form. Instead of “the minister being your MP,” we would have “your MP calling the minister.” The pressure thus shifts but does not vanish. Voters do not change their behavior. The critical issue is that if citizens continue to vote based on appointments, favors, and local demands, then the system perpetuates itself regardless of institutions. There is also a risk from the claim of a “government without political legitimacy.” If ministers are not elected, they may be seen as “appointed technocrats.” This increases the distance from society and the backlash.
The deeper problem in Greece is that the network of political relationships (clientelism) constitutes a way of accessing resources—that is, an “informal social security mechanism.” It cannot be abolished by a single institutional measure. Moreover, if, as announced, it is combined with the reinstatement of ministers who lose their seats in Parliament (!), the clientelism situation will worsen. The only solution for modernizing politics is the abolition of the flawed preference cross (nowhere else in the world except Cyprus), and the establishment of either a single-member district electoral system (one seat per district, no substitutes—so party leaders would also be elected individually) or a mixed system (half the seats in each district single-member—the leaders included—and half by list). Everything else is just excuses to do nothing…
(Andreas Andrianopoulos’s book, War in Iran: Europe’s Tragic Failures, Epikentro, 2026) is available in bookstores.
