Greece and Strategic Autonomy: The Paradox of Dependent Active Diplomacy
Despite active diplomacy, Greece remains reactive to Turkey's agenda, lacking the strategic will to assert regional leadership and shift from crisis management to shaping its own geopolitical narrative.
In international politics, the difference between the actor and the reactor is not merely semantic. It constitutes the dividing line between the one who shapes the strategic narrative and the one who follows developments. Despite the undeniable dynamism Greece has demonstrated in recent years in the diplomatic—and especially the energy—field, it remains trapped in a deeply reactive behavioral pattern. This is precisely where the core of the problem lies, which official rhetoric rarely acknowledges.
• By Christos I. Moysidis
External Determination as a Structural Phenomenon
External determination is not a matter of impressions or temporary circumstances. It is a matter of structure. A country can proclaim full strategic autonomy while simultaneously organizing its entire foreign policy around the agenda of a third actor. It can vehemently reject a characterization and yet still be accurately described by that characterization. This is exactly what happens in Greece’s case vis-à-vis Turkey.
For decades, Ankara has operated on terms of strategic initiative. It sets the framework of confrontation, chooses the timing and manner of escalation, unilaterally creates faits accomplis, and transfers the burden of reaction to Athens.
A recent move to legally enshrine the doctrine of the “Blue Homeland” is a characteristic example. Ankara did not seek diplomatic consensus nor put its legal claims up for substantive negotiation. It simply proceeded, leaving Greece facing two equally difficult choices: either a strong reaction with the risk of escalation or a milder stance that could be interpreted as tacit tolerance.
This continuous cycle of defense and reaction is not coincidental. It is the result of decades of strategic asymmetry. One side shapes the game; the other tries to play it as best it can under the imposed rules.
Diplomatic Activity and Its Limits
It would be unfair to overlook that Greek foreign policy has shown remarkable activity in recent years. The deepening of relations with Egypt, Israel, France, and the United States, participation in trilateral cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as active engagement in the discussion on European energy security, constitute substantial diplomatic achievements that should not be underestimated.
However, the critical question is not whether Greece forms alliances, but whether it leverages them to take strategic initiative itself or if it mainly uses them as a mechanism to contain each new Turkish provocation. The distinction is decisive. In the latter case, alliances function as a defensive shield. In the former, they become a lever to shape the regional balance of power. Greece appears to operate primarily within the first logic.
Sovereign Rights and the Deficit of Strategic Will
Regarding the safeguarding of our sovereign rights, the picture becomes even more complex. Our homeland holds strong legal, historical, and geographical arguments supporting its positions in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the active institutionalization and consolidation of the Greek presence in the contested areas remain fragmented.
Athens seems to favor managing tensions over a more structural overturning of the status quo. However, under conditions of constant Turkish revisionist pressure, such a stance carries the risk of gradual retreat without formal concession.
True strategic autonomy is not reflected in the number of bilateral contacts or joint announcements. It is measured by a country’s ability to set the agenda itself, compel the opponent to react to its moves, and shape the terms of confrontation rather than adapt to them.
From Crisis Management to Policy Formation
Greece may have the advantage of initiative and possesses the means to take any initiative it chooses. What appears to be missing is neither the resources, nor the international legitimacy, nor the alliances, but the political and strategic will to shape the regional agenda itself instead of being confined to the role of managing developments initiated by others.
The rhetoric of non-external determination, no matter how often it is repeated, is not enough to alter the structure of reality. Greece will be able to truly overcome external determination only when it ceases to await the next Turkish move to determine its own stance and begins to set the terms of the next round itself.
